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15 August 1953

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
SUMMARY

GENERAL

- ✓ 1. USSR apparently maneuvering to participate in postarmistice conference (page 3).

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2. Amami Islands' return reversing anti-American trend in Japan (page 4).



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SOUTH ASIA


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GENERAL

1. USSR apparently maneuvering to participate in postarmistice conference:

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[REDACTED] Soviet UN delegate Vyshinsky on 13 August suggested to the UN secretary general that a postarmistice political conference should include all main groups, countries and viewpoints interested in the general issues, but stated that he had no definite instructions from his government. He referred to the fact that in its prearmistice proposal for the prisoner of war commission the Soviet Union had suggested a group of 11 nations, including itself. Vyshinsky added that the General Assembly should decide on the nations to take part in the conference.

Comment: On 31 July Soviet UN delegate Tsarapkin expressed a preference for a conference limited to the "two sides" in the dispute, presumably without Soviet participation, and argued that the General Assembly had no responsibility under the armistice agreement to name the participants.

Vyshinsky's shift in approach may be in response to strong sentiment among UN members, including Britain and France, in favor of inviting the USSR as well as India to participate in a broad conference. The US favors a conference with the General Assembly designating representatives from among the 16 UN nations which fought in Korea with the Communists deciding on their own representation, which could include the USSR.

The Kremlin may now see an opportunity for gaining indirect recognition of Communist China by a UN recommendation for Peiping's participation in the conference. The Kremlin probably also wishes to avoid having a Soviet bid for participation rejected and accordingly may be waiting for a coalescence of Western sentiment before taking a firm position on the membership question.

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FAR EAST

2. Amami Islands' return reversing anti-American trend in Japan:


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The return of the Amami Islands to Japan on 8 August may have reversed the tide of anti-Americanism which had been gathering momentum during the past six months, in the opinion of the American embassy in Tokyo. It is also the first American postoccupation action to have a significantly favorable effect on the generally leftist Japanese intelligentsia and publicists.

Comment: The return of the islands removes a major source of friction between the United States and Japan. The Japanese press contrasted their return with the Soviet Union's failure to recognize Japan's historic rights to the Habomai and Shikotan islands north of Japan. The press also acknowledged that American retention of the remaining Ryukyu and the Bonin islands was necessary for Japanese security.

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SOUTH ASIA

4. Pakistani army remains calm over Kashmir crisis:

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Pakistani army headquarters near Kashmir is maintaining an attitude of complete calm with regard to the recent developments in Indian-held Kashmir, according to the American army attache in Karachi. The Pakistani army is not contemplating cancellation of leaves and does not plan to move additional troops into the area.

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Comment: Pakistan, as in previous crises, is apparently taking all possible precautions to avoid a conflict.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Comment on threat to depose the Moroccan sultan:

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sultan of Morocco probably will not be deposed. It is anticipated

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that despite conflicting rumors the resident general and the sultan will reach a compromise, the exact nature of which may not be made public. An acceptable compromise must enable the French to claim that the sultan has accepted their demands and yet not alienate the sultan's following.

The American embassy in Paris reports that Premier Laniel, Foreign Minister Bidault, and Resident General Guillaume are confident they can use the current situation to force the sultan to accept the French reform program. The French authorities are also in a position to bring sufficient pressure on El Glaoui, the sultan's chief opponent, to prevent him from upsetting the status quo.

While the possibility of clashes between rival factions exists, it is not probable that large-scale disturbances will occur since the 56,000 French security forces are capable of maintaining order. Basic tensions will not be alleviated, however, and El Glaoui and his supporters will continue to be a source of trouble.

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